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Abstract  
New Zealand is prone to significant natural hazards. Past experience in New Zealand has 
demonstrated an ability to cope with small-scale natural disasters; but the recent Canterbury 
earthquake sequence, in particularly, the September 4, 2010 and February 22, 2011 
earthquakes in Christchurch, has tested the nation’s capability of tackling a large-scale event. 
This article looks at the long-term reconstruction process following the Canterbury earthquake 
sequence. It identifies the organisations, institutions and critical decisions that likely govern 
and drive community recovery. The disaster and its impacts in Christchurch have created 
challenges and issues that distinguish its recovery from others. Liquefaction-related land 
zoning, insurance, and recovery planning for Central Christchurch dictate different approaches 
to reconstruction of housing, infrastructure, and commercial buildings. Institutional and 
technological innovations, such as alliance-like project management, emerging agencies for 
managing the recovery, and a new seismic design for building foundations, all feature in the 
post-earthquake recovery practice. Current reconstruction in Christchurch provides a 
laboratory showing how the distinctive governance structure affects the systems of community 
recovery. The lessons learned from this event provide insights which can improve the design of 
recovery planning in New Zealand, and beyond. 
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Introduction  
New Zealand is susceptible to a wide range of natural hazards. When the Darfield earthquake 
with a magnitude of 7.1 struck Christchurch on 4th of September 2010, there was little prior 
experience in New Zealand to deal with a large-scale post-disaster recovery. The major 
aftershock on 22 February 2011, causing 185 death, along with on-going aftershocks, 
compounded the impacts on the city and added difficulties in restoring the city’s infrastructure 
utilities and buildings which suffered significant damages from a sequence of events. 
Complexities and uncertainties are commonly endemic in a post-disaster situation, particularly 
following a large-scale event like the earthquakes in Christchurch. There is no instant ‘fix’ for 
disaster rebuild scenarios, however, order and progress can be achieved if parties involved in 
reconstruction have the appropriate methods for managing critical projects (Project 
Management Institute, 2005).  
In New Zealand, the Government chose to enter into the purely commercial insurance market by 
creating the Earthquake Commission (EQC) to serve as its own insurance scheme. Provided 
insurance cover, known as the Earthquake Commission Cover (EQCover), is compulsory for 
private property and insures against loss or damage from natural disasters including earthquakes. 
If the dwelling or personal possessions are more valuable than the maximum amounts EQC will 
cover, or are outside the scope of what EQC will cover, home owners arrange extra cover with 
their insurance company (Earthquake Commission, 2012). This market intervention mechanism, 
however, has shaped the way the repairs and rebuilds of residential housing are undertaken in 
Christchurch following the earthquakes. 
This paper draws on Resilient Organisations’ on-going longitudinal study1 of post-earthquake 
reconstruction in Christchurch since the 4th of September earthquake in 2010. The study was to 
understand the impacts of the earthquake sequence on the built environment, and examine the 
post-disaster strategies and approaches taken by multiple agencies. By using case studies, this 
paper looks at the overall recovery governance structure and the specific reconstruction 
approaches used in two different sectors. This paper aspires to 1) advance the understanding of 
distinct governance structures adopted for reconstruction projects in Christchurch; 2) identify key 
elements that feature within the activities of recovery.  
The Canterbury earthquake sequence  
Following the first Darfield earthquake on 4th September 2010, the Canterbury region of New 
Zealand has been struck by a sequence2 of over 10,000 earthquakes, including several major 
events. The magnitude 6.3 earthquake that devastated Christchurch on 22 February 2011 was 
the most severe of all the events in the earthquake sequence (commonly known as the 
Canterbury earthquake sequence). This quake was caused by an unknown fault which was about 
14 kilometres in length and extended east-northeast from Cashmere to the Avon-Heathcote 
estuary area (See Figure 1). The impact from this event was significant, causing the death of 185 
people, collapse of many buildings, further damage to infrastructure and widespread 
liquefaction.  
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Figure 1: Geographic location of Christchurch and the two major earthquakes (Source: GNS Science, 
2011) 
The Canterbury earthquake sequence overall has been estimated as the third most expensive 
disaster in history in terms of insurance losses (Swiss Re., 2012). Earthquake damage has arisen 
from shaking and ground failure including lateral spreading, liquefaction, landslide and rock falls. 
Figures in Table 1 show the estimate of the total capital cost of the rebuild in 2012 and indicative 
funding shares between sectors. As more precise information becoming available, the latest 
figures released on 28 April 2013 by the Government suggest that the rebuild with improvements 
included could reach $40 billion with high levels of uncertainty remaining. The damage is about 
19% of New Zealand’s GDP.  
Table 1: Estimated cost of recovery, source: (CERA, 2012b) 
Cost shares between sectors $billion 
Residential 60% 12-18 
Infrastructure 10% 2-3 
Commercial 10% 2-3 
Government 10% 2-3 
Community assets 10% 2-3 
Total $20-30 billion 
 
 
Indicative funding shares % 
Private insurers 30 
EQC 40 
Central government 20 
Local government and others 10 
More than 60% of CBD buildings in Christchurch were severely damaged (CERA, 2012a). Over 
150,000 homes which are around three quarters of Christchurch’s housing stock sustained some 
damage from the earthquakes. The total number of individual building, land and contents claims 
received exceeds 600,000 (Earthquake Commission, 2011). Damage to infrastructure was 
widespread across the city. It has been estimated that about 1,021 kilometres of roading needed 
rebuilding, which is around 52% of Christchurch's urban sealed roads. The earthquakes damaged 
51 kilometres of water supply mains, 528 kilometres of the sewer system and badly damaged the 
sewer pumping stations within the city. Around 100 sewerage pumping stations needed to be 
repaired or replaced. The most recent cost estimate is tabulated in Table 1, indicating that 
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insurers’ estimates of all the earthquake events exceeds $30 billion with high levels of 
uncertainty remaining. 
Following the major event on 22 February 2011, the forecasts of the New Zealand Treasury 
(2011) assumed that a big increase in residential investment activity would take place in 2012, 
with commercial activity and infrastructure spending growing steadily in 2013 and 2014. While 
some construction activity picked up in the second half of 2012, Canterbury region-wide rebuild 
activity still remained below what had been expected, two years after the 22 February event. 
Lingering issues around land decisions, insurance payments and acquiring consents have added 
uncertainty about the scale, cost and timing of the rebuild. Against these backdrops, this research 
aims to examine the governing mechanisms used for managing the recovery and rebuild projects 
over the last two years in Christchurch. 
Post-disaster recovery governance and institutional arrangement 
After major disasters, the process of recovery and reconstruction tends to follow one of four 
models: the paternalistic model, the infusion of aid model, the limited intervention model, and 
the market model (Comerio, 1998). Those four models cover a wide range of institutional 
frameworks of recovery and reconstruction following a disaster. On one side of the spectrum is 
the recovery governance structure in which a government takes on the entire program of 
rebuilding; on the other side is a market-centred approach in the recovery effort. In order to 
understand the recovery process at various points of this spectrum, various stakeholders and 
their level of influence and power over reconstruction should be identified (Inam, 2005). This 
section outlines the four models of recovery governance. 
1) The paternalistic model: this model promotes an idea that only an activist government 
has the capacity to provide aid for communities to restore some level of normalcy and 
decency in the aftermath of large-scale disasters (Dreier, 2006; Hartman & Squires, 2006). 
However, the success of this model depends on the capacity of governments at different 
levels under an overarching governance system (Alexander, 2002). This government-
driven recovery is assisted by various organizations, both civic, and non-profit with a 
limited degree of community participation. This model was seen in the city of Tangshan, 
China, during its recovery from devastating earthquake (Comerio, 1998). The entire 
program of rebuilding was undertaken by the government with national and local funds. 
The process of recovery is primarily influenced by the decisions from the governmental 
authorities. 
2) The infusion of aid model: involves the international relief organizations to finance and 
oversee the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure and properties. Like many disasters 
in developing countries, the recovery of Sumatra from the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami 
(Meisl, Safaie, Elwood, Gupta, & Kowsari, 2006), of Bam from the 2003 Bam earthquake 
(Ghafory-Ashtiany & Hosseini, 2008; Omidvar, Zafari, & Derakhshan, 2009) is comparable 
to this capital infusion model. The infusion of outside capital, in the form of international 
aid combined with outside and local expertise, is used to support reconstruction for 
communities. This model, however, has received criticism such as the possibility of 
misappropriating funds and rebuilding projects lack of cultural sensitivity (Comerio, 1998). 
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3) The limited intervention model: over time, the world has witnessed a shift from 
government-led approach to market-oriented approach in the response to disasters, 
particularly in the reconstruction phase. The limited intervention model calls for a more 
participatory post-disaster rebuilding from both the private sector and communities with 
less government involvement. In some cases, the stakeholder participation philosophy 
prevailed particularly in the stage of recovery planning and implementation (Ganapati & 
Ganapati, 2009; Ying, 2009). The program of community involvement in recovery 
activities requires to be well designed with a combination of technical, financial, and 
administrative assistance from public and private sectors.  
4) The market model: this model simply lets the market place sort out the winners and 
losers after a disaster, focusing government and charitable aid only on the emergency 
period (Comerio, 1998). This is a typical model used in the United States and other 
developed countries where the market forces such as banks and insurance and private 
sector play a predominant role in recovery. A number of scholars such as Gotham (2008) 
and Peck (2006), examined the process of post-disaster recovery and rebuilding in New 
York City since the September 11 event and in New Orleans since the Hurricane Katrina in 
2005 through the lens of ‘neoliberalism’. They argued that using market-centred 
approaches for urban recovery and rebuilding in those two areas should be seen not as 
coherent or sustainable responses since private sector-oriented restructuring of disaster 
aid only exposes and even reinforces the socio-economic vulnerabilities of affected 
communities.  
The government and institutional approach to disaster reconstruction varies across these models 
depending on the type of funding sources being channelled. Additionally, the post-disaster 
reconstruction governance also includes the enactment of legislative and regulatory 
arrangements, establishment of national and local institutions, formulation of national policies 
implemented at the local level and involvement of other social and private agencies. These 
elements, according to Inam (2005) however, are particularly relevant to each political-economic 
context and set of specific urban conditions. The recovery and reconstruction of Christchurch 
following the earthquakes, however, appears to fall into the model between the limited 
intervention and market model. The following section is to examine the governance 
arrangements in the overall recovery in Christchurch and by using case studies to present the 
features that are prominent in its recovery activities.  
Research methods 
A  case study method was adopted for this research due to its explanatory nature (Yin, 2003). 
Data have been collected through field-based observations, interviews and other qualitative 
records over the last one and half years since September 2011. During the field visits to 
Christchurch, a range of semi-structured interviews were conducted covering the topics of 
recovery activities, critical decisions, project management modes, resourcing challenges and 
other emerging issues that arise during the rebuild. This paper gives a primary focus to the 
governing structures used for the rebuild of city’s built environment.  
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A profile of an overall recovery governance structure and three specific approaches to the rebuild 
of housing, infrastructure and commercial sectors are delineated in Table 2 below. The rebuild in 
the CBD, however, is much slower and more complex than the reconstruction efforts taking place 
in housing and infrastructure sectors. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, only two sectors, 
housing and infrastructure, were selected for detailed case study analysis.  
The interviewees were selected in terms of their involvement in the reconstruction effort, their 
position and experience with respect to recovery management and governing. Qualitative 
information on perspectives of these participants was captured, including: 1) Overall recovery 
management and governing structure, 2) Reconstruction approach to residential and 
infrastructure rebuild projects, and 3) Challenges and issues emerging from the operations of 
those governance structures. The following sections report research results based on these three 
areas. 
Table 2: Governance structures in reconstruction sectors 
Sector Governance approach (structure and form) Leading agency 
Overall 
recovery 
governance 
A Central Agency created to lead and coordinate the 
on-going recovery effort 
Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery Authority (CERA) 
Housing Insurers’ Project Management Offices (PMOs) 
managing housing repairs and reconstruction 
EQC and commercial 
insurers, and their PMOs 
Infrastructure Alliance between asset owners and delivery teams Stronger Christchurch 
Infrastructure Rebuild Team 
(SCIRT) 
Commercial 
buildings in 
the CBD 
Partnership between Central Government (through 
CCDU within CERA), the Christchurch City Council 
(CCC) and other groups to focus on rebuilding 
Christchurch's CBD 
Christchurch Central 
Development Unit (CCDU), 
Christchurch City Council 
 
Overall recovery management in Christchurch 
Historically, a risk-based approach to hazard management was adopted in New Zealand’s Civil 
Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) arrangements, based on ‘4Rs’, namely reduction, 
readiness, response and recovery. With a vision of national resilience, ‘Focus on Recovery’ 
(MCDEM, 2005) − a framework encompassing the community and four environments: social, 
economic, natural and built environment – was adopted into the CDEM framework in 2005 and 
provides for multi-level and multi-agency structures and processes to be involved in post-disaster 
recovery.  
Shortly following the Darfield earthquake, on 14 September 2010, the Central Government 
released the Canterbury Earthquake Response and Recovery Act 2010 which stipulated the 
establishment of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Commission (Parliament of New Zealand, 
2010). The purpose of this Commission was to advise the Government on the recovery issues and 
liaison between the central and local Government.  
However, the scale of the 22 February earthquake outstripped the capacity of local authorities, 
and further wide-ranging legislation, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery (CER) Act, was passed 
 i-Rec 2013  7 
in April 2011, which created a new entity – the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority 
(CERA). As the state of emergency ended in May 2011, CERA took over from Civil Defence and 
acts as a primary agency driving earthquake recovery in Canterbury region. Under the CER Act, 
CERA was tasked with developing an overarching recovery strategy, while the Christchurch City 
Council developed a Central City Plan. Drafts of two plans were published in September and 
August 2011 for public consultation and were finalised in May and July 2012, respectively.  
The CERA Act 2011 also stipulated the role of the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery 
who was appointed by the Prime Minister to coordinate the recovery effort at the executive 
government level. This role reports to the Cabinet Committee on Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery, which was tasked to oversee and coordinate the government’s response to support 
the recovery and reconstruction following the earthquakes. 
The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA), as the primary agency for recovery, 
works closely with the Minister, along with all government departments contributing to the 
recovery efforts. Other government agencies and departments are coordinated through a Senior 
Officials Group, chaired by the Chief Executive of CERA. Elected members, commissioners and 
leaders of the strategic partners are engaged through the Recovery Strategy Advisory Committee 
(RSAC). The Recovery Strategy (CERA, 2012) which was released in 2012 is the overarching 
document to coordinate action amongst government and strategic partners. Figure 2 below 
illustrate this framework covering all levels of governance (political, central government, local 
government and stakeholder/community). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Recovery governance structure 
As mentioned earlier, the insurance companies including both government-led Earthquake 
Commission (EQC) and private insurers have been a major player in the wake of the Canterbury 
earthquakes. In general, private insurers manage over-cap repairs and EQC manages under-cap 
repairs (the cap is usually $100,000 plus Goods and Services Tax). Some claims which are for 
comparatively low-value damage are cash-settled, in which case the homeowner manages their 
own repair. 
In the aftermath of the earthquakes, a Project Management Organisation/Office (PMO) 3 
approach to the end-to-end building design and construction activities were employed by most of 
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insurance companies for managing their housing repair programmes4. This paper will focus on 
the case studies of EQC’s housing repair programme and the Infrastructure rebuild programme in 
Christchurch. 
Reconstruction project governance  
Case 1: Canterbury Home Repair Programme (CHRP) 
Following the Darfiled earthquake on 4 September 2010, the Earthquake Commission (EQC) took 
swift actions in response to housing repairs under its insurance policy in the Canterbury region. 
The Canterbury Home Repair Programme (CHRP) was set up for this purpose. EQC entered into a 
contractual agreement with Fletcher Construction, the New Zealand’s largest construction 
company, as a single point Project Management Office (PMO) to manage its repair programme 
for Canterbury homes with damage between $10,000 and $100,000 per claim. Claims below this 
range where there is structural damage are also managed through CHRP. 
The Project Management Office is known as ‘Fletcher EQR’, representing the earthquake 
recovery division of Fletcher Construction. Fletcher EQR operates from 18 geographical hubs 
across the earthquake affected region. Fletcher EQR also helped to manage repairs to deal with 
winter heating needs resulting from earthquake damage. The repair work is carried out by 
independent contractors, including many local Canterbury tradespeople who have completed an 
accreditation process. The accreditation process factors in each contractor’s trade qualifications, 
experience and other factors to ensure that appropriate standards are established for quality 
work. The governance structure for the Canterbury Home Repair Programme (CHRP) is illustrated 
in Figure 3 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Governance structure for EQC's housing repair programme 
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Under the above governance structure, Fletcher EQR adopted a straightforward project 
management process for dealing with housing repairs. The scope of work to be carried out on 
each property is agreed between Fletcher EQR and the homeowner, and aligns with the EQC 
initial assessment. Once the scope is confirmed, Fletcher EQR assigns a competent accredited 
contractor to do the work. However, a nominated Fletcher EQR Contract Supervisor will oversee 
all work undertaken on each project and check that quality standards are being met. The Contact 
Supervisor acts as the point of contact between the homeowner and the contractor for any 
issues that may arise during the repair. When the repair work is completed, it will be inspected 
and signed off by Fletcher EQR. Rectification is available during the 90 day defect period if any 
problems with the repair are found after completion.  
Case 2: Alliance structure for the infrastructure rebuild 
The scale of the infrastructure rebuild in the Canterbury region is unprecedented. It is regarded 
as one of New Zealand’s largest and most complex civil engineering projects and needs a large 
number of resources over a period of more than five years (Christchurch City Council, 2011). In 
order to restore the city’s infrastructure system damaged from the Darfield earthquake, the 
Christchurch City Council (CCC) established an Infrastructure Rebuild Management Office (IRMO). 
Contractors were appointed to manage the repair and rebuilding programme of the Council 
infrastructure.  
Significant further damage to the infrastructure facilities during the 22 February 2011 event has 
escalated the Government response. An organisational structure of a larger scale was needed to 
cope with increased repair and rebuild demands. Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild 
Team (SCIRT) was therefore created to replace IRMO. The transition from IRMO to SCIRT was 
expedited in August 2011 in terms of accountability for delivery of all asset assessments, project 
definition, concept and detailed design and construction delivery. SCIRT has taken over full 
accountability for the above from 1 September 2011, responsible for rebuilding horizontal 
infrastructure in Christchurch following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. 
SCIRT has adopted an alliance model which has been commonly used in delivering major 
infrastructure projects. The SCIRT alliance is made up of eight partner organisations. This includes 
three client organisations, the Christchurch City Council (CCC), CERA, and New Zealand Transport 
Agency (NZTA), each of which plays a different role: CCC and NZTA act as asset owner and funder 
while CERA is mandated to coordinate the overall rebuild activity on behalf of the Government. 
Five main contractor organisations were chosen as delivery teams within the alliance, including 
City Care, Downer Construction, Fletcher Construction, Fulton Hogan and McConnell Powell.  
SCIRT is effectively a ‘virtual organisation’ which has a leadership team for  governance (Aaltonen 
& Sivonen) and a management team (AMT) which looks after more than 200 people who are 
called the Integrated Alliance Team (IAT). This team is responsible for delivering the planning, 
design and management functions to enable the delivery teams to do the work. The delivery 
teams are responsible for the construction on the ground. They consist of the five main 
contractors described above and their subcontractors and suppliers. The governance structure 
for SCIRT is illustrated in Figure 4 below. 
The alliance model adopted by SCIRT, as shown in Figure 4, is a form of collaboration between a 
client, consultant and contractor who mutually agree to undertake the work to target levels of 
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quality, cost and time. An additional rewards/sanctions mechanism is put in place to measure the 
performance of individual delivery contractors over time. Construction work will be allocated to 
them based on their performance. This leads to a high degree of trust between the parties and a 
focus on performing to the highest expectations. The alliance model of such kind replaced the 
traditional client-contractor management model and offered more flexibility in the way the 
stakeholders are coordinated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: SCIRT governance structure for infrastructure rebuild  
Challenges arising from recovery governance operations  
The decisions about why and how to manage the recovery projects, as shown in the above two 
case studies, indicate the particular social, economic and political situation in Christchurch, and 
New Zealand nationwide. In spite of the varied stakeholders involved, funding mechanisms and 
organisational structures, the common method which Fletcher EQR and SCIRT share is a project 
management approach. This section reports on the issues related to the recovery projects and 
challenges that emerge from their governance operations. 
Managing interface between EQC and private insurers 
The Canterbury earthquake sequence, itself, has posed a number of challenges to the recovery 
and reconstruction efforts. Issues around the insurance payout have been reported by most 
interviewees as a major hurdle to advancing repair and rebuild. Settling claims where damage 
has caused by a number of successive earthquake events is much more complex than settling 
claims from a single natural disaster. Earthquake Commission (EQC) has to attribute or apportion 
the damage to individual events. Therefore, the speed of claim processing and subsequent repair 
management is determined by how quickly apportion between claims can be addressed and the 
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efficiency of communication between EQC and private insurers when deciding who will manage 
the repair.    
Land zoning affecting the work prioritisation  
Similar to the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji earthquake in Kobe (Comerio, 2005) and the 2009 Victorian 
bushfires in Australia (Chang-Richards et al., 2013), a complex planning process involved a variety 
of land-use and zoning adjustments to aid the rebuild process. Some areas of Christchurch have 
been assessed as red zones and declared not suitable for rebuilding, affecting more than 7,500 
residential properties. One area where alignment for the horizontal infrastructure rebuild is 
required is with future land issues. This includes both the servicing of new subdivisions and 
developments in the city and also the treatment of red zone areas identified by CERA. For the 
housing repair programmes, new foundations of innovative design and materials are also needed 
for other zones such as green and orange5. Land zoning decisions thus had a great impact on the 
prioritisation of rebuild works. 
Resource shortages for rebuild 
The shortage of resources has been identified by interviewees as a critical issue in dealing with 
increased recovery demands. Resource pressures on rebuild projects were primarily from human 
resources associated with structural, architectural and land issues. Resource shortfalls have had 
an inflationary impact which flows through to higher costs. The inflationary effects of increased 
construction professional fees and an increase in temporary house rentals for housing inbound 
construction workforce have become major concerns. However, as the rebuild proceeds, 
construction-related inflation is likely to put extra pressure on the Canterbury labour market, 
community recovery and regional economic development of Christchurch. 
Not business-as-usual  
One of the challenges that, to some degree, are facing all the rebuild agencies is how to manage 
the scope, cost, time and the risk in a changing environment. The interviewees have highlighted 
that although a project management approach was adopted, it is not business-as-usual any more. 
Both housing repairs and infrastructure rebuild programme create several pressures that require 
the project managers at a strategic level and project teams at an operational level to have certain 
competencies. For instance, the disaster effects on local communities require the Fletcher EQR 
and SCIRT to create new ways of working, particularly in dealing with distressed and traumatised 
home owners. More socio-economic considerations in relation to the affected populations need 
to be included in the project plans. The uncertainties caused by on-going aftershocks, insurance, 
land zoning issues have created a dilemma of project management – how much planning to do. It 
is important that the project plans are designed to be flexible and able to response to changes as 
the rebuild evolves. 
Conclusion 
Any post-disaster recovery programme or project is a reflection of the vision for longer-term 
outcomes, as well as the capacity and capability needed over time. This paper takes a governance 
perspective to look at the governing structures for managing recovery and reconstruction 
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following the Canterbury earthquakes. In particular, it shows how the housing recovery is 
managed under the Government’s market intervention mechanism (the Earthquake Commission) 
and how an alliance model is adopted to manage the infrastructure rebuild of a large scale.  
The information presented in this paper shows that inherent uncertainties and complexities are 
challenging recovery decision makers and practitioners in Canterbury. By capturing data from 
agencies and organisations involved in recovery decision making and management, this paper 
provides an understanding of how New Zealand is responding to a sequence of earthquakes 
which challenged local capacity. A combination of market response and a government-led market 
intervention mechanism through EQC featured in its recovery practice. More than that, a project 
management approach was adopted in the context of rebuilding housing and infrastructure. The 
on-going research will capture information from those who were affected by the earthquakes in 
order to gain insights into the effectiveness of this governance structure. 
The recovery governance decisions and reconstruction approaches provide an understanding of 
how the distinctive governance structure affects the systems of community recovery. The project 
management methods, particularly insurers using local construction companies as the Project 
Management Organisations (PMOs) for housing repair and rebuild programmes are worth further 
investigation. The alliance-type partnership model for managing the infrastructure rebuild is not 
simply an extension from alliancing for construction at normal times; it is a novel way of dealing 
with risks and changes in an unusual environment. Future research is needed to examine the 
effectiveness of these applications and the associated pitfalls. 
‘Governing structures’ included in this paper contributes to the base of knowledge and practice 
that can be adapted and applied in managing post-disaster recovery projects.  However, with 
complex projects including the delivery of longer-term outcomes that could benefit the disaster-
affected region and communities, how the project will be measured and managed is important. 
Some additional steps are required to bridge the gap between commissioning the new rebuilds 
and achieving the desired redevelopment outcomes. For instance, it may be necessary to allow 
time for people involved in the rebuild to gain experience to convert new skills into 
competencies. The Government, along with the Project Management Offices (PMOs) may also 
need to give industry time to response to new/improved requirements of rebuild or market.  
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Notes 
                                            
1 For further information on the research undertaken by the Resilient Organisations, please go to 
www.resorgs.org.nz. 
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2 The major aftershocks following the Darfield earthquake on 4th of September 2010 include Mw 4.7 December 26, 
2010, Mw 6.8 on February 22, 2011, Mw 6.0 June 13, 2011, Mw5.8 December 23, 2011 and Mw 5.2 January 7, 2012. 
Since the Darfield earthquake, more than 7000 aftershocks with magnitudes up to 6.2 have been recorded by GNS. 
These earthquakes are termed the Canterbury earthquake sequence.  
3 The definition of a Project Management Organisation/Office (PMO) is an organizational unit working on behalf of 
an insurance company with responsibility for the central, coordinated management of building project s such as 
repair and rebuilding of buildings that have been damaged by the Canterbury earthquake. 
4 Fletcher Construction has been appointed by the Earthquake Commission (EQC) as the PMO for building work in 
the $10,000 - $100,000 value. Hawkins Limited has been appointed as the PMO for IAG (NZI and State). Arrow 
International has been appointed as the PMO for AMI (Southern Response). Mainzeal and MWH joint venture has 
been appointed as the PMO for Vero/ stream has been appointed as the PMO for Tower. Ireland has been appointed 
as the PMO for Lumley. 
5 For further information about the land zoning in Christchurch, refer to http://cera.govt.nz/land-information/land-
zones 
